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Adler: The Evolution of the Justice Department's Power to Investigate Ci

THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENTS POWER TO INVESTIGATE CIVIL
VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Like any other plaintiff, the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department (the Department)' must have adequate discovery opportunities to litigate successfully. 2 However, the Department's
1. The Department is the primary enforcer of the antitrust laws. H.R. REP. No.
1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2567, 2568; A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWVS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMiERICA
373-74 (2d ed. 1970); 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 8500 (Dec. 30, 1974). The Department has responsibility for:
General enforcement, by criminal and civil proceedings, of the federal
antitrust laws and other laws relating to the protection of competition and
the prohibition of restraints of trade and monopolization, including conduct
of surveys of possible violations of antitrust laws, conduct of grand jury proceedings, issuance and enforcement of civil investigative demands, civil actions to obtain orders and injunctions, civil actions to recover forfeitures or
damages for injuries sustained by the United States as a result of antitrust
law violations, proceedings to enforce compliance with final judgments in
antitrust suits, and negotiation of consent judgments in civil actions; criminql actions to impose penalties including actions for the imposition of penalties for conspiring to defraud the Federal Government by violation of the
antitrust laws; participation as amicus curiae in private antitrust litigation;
and prosecution or defense of appeals in antitrust proceedings.
28 C.F.R. § 0.40(a) (1979).
The Department is not the only governmental body to enforce the antitrust
laws. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces the antitrust laws through
administrative proceedings. The FTC is empowered to hold hearings to determine
whether a party is engaging in "unfair methods of competition," Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), and practices that violate the antitrust laws
constitute "unfair methods of competition." FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683,
689-93 (1948). The FTC may order that unfair practices be discontinued, 15 U.S.C. §
45 (1976), thereby, in the case of antitrust violations, enforcing the antitrust laws.
Moreover, states enforce antitrust laws. A state may sue to recover compensation
for injuries suffered from an antitrust violation. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159
(1942). A state also has power to bring a parens patriae suit to recover compensation
for injuries that natural person residents of the state suffer as a result of the violation.
15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2567, 2568. Commenting on the need for information, the
Attorney General reported: "No field of litigation involves facts more complex and
records more extensive than are found in the Government's antitrust cases. The task
of amassing the voluminous data essential to successful antitrust enforcement is of
considerable magnitude." H.R. REP No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 22 (letter
from Att'y Gen. Edward H. Levi), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2596, 2616.
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precomplaint discovery needs exceed those of a private litigant.
Considerations of fairness necessitate that the government investigate thoroughly before filing a complaint, 3 since merely commencing an action may affect a corporation and its shareholders
adversely, and an investigation may reveal that bringing suit is inappropriate. 4 Filing suit against a corporation generally causes the
price of its stock to fall, especially if the corporation lists its stock
on a national exchange. 5 If discovery 6 reveals that no antitrust violation has occurred, the suit can be discontinued, but the price of
the corporation's stock may not return to its previous level. 7 Moreover, once the public is aware the Department has commenced
suit, fear of adverse public opinion if suit is discontinued may influence the Department to pursue a suit that discovery has revealed
lacks merit. This would result in a futile trial that wastes the parties' resources and the court's time. 8
The Department can use the grand jury to investigate possible violations when it contemplates criminal action. 9 However,
the grand jury is not an available investigative tool when only civil
action is contemplated.' 0 Prior to 1962, the Department had no satisfactory means for investigating suspected civil violations of the antitrust laws. In 1962, Congress expanded the Department's investigatory power. Experience in subsequent years revealed that the
Department needed still greater investigatory power and in 1976
Congress provided the Department with increased investigatory
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2567, 2568.
4. In fiscal 1976, the Department conducted nearly 400 investigations but filed
only 82 suits. Reeves, How the Antitrust Division Can Use Its New Powers to Obtain Statistical Records and Testimony from Trade Associations and Trade AssociationExecutives, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 355, 356 (1977).
5. Siegel, The Antitrust Civil Process Act: The Attorney-General's Pre-Action
Key to Company Files, 10 VILL. L. REv. 413, 417-18 (1965); Note, Trade Regulation
-Investigatory Powers of the Justice Department-The Antitrust Civil Process Act,
45 ORE. L. REV. 240, 242 (1966).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 control the scope of discovery in a civil proceeding.
7. Siegel, supra note 5, at 418; Note, supra note 5, at 242.
8.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST

LAWS, REPORT 344 (1955) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. This committee commented: "Incomplete investigation may mean proceedings not justified by more
careful search and study. Public retreat by the prosecutor may then be difficult, if

not impossible, and the result may be a futile trial exhausting the resources of the litigants and increasing court congestion." Id.
9. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(a).
10. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
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capabilities. This Note traces the evolution of the Department's
power to investigate suspected civil antitrust violations.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS

"Like any policeman the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice must first detect crime before it can prosecute it."" The
12
Department has five ways of detecting antitrust violations: (1) Complaints about a company from competitors or consumers; (2) newspaper articles; (3) information referred to the Department by other
governmental agencies; (4) antitrust suits brought by private parties;
and (5) provisions of a consent decree or judgment previously obtained in a civil antitrust suit against a company that allow the Department to inspect the company's files or interview its employees
to ensure that the company complies with the consent decree or
judgment.
When the Department suspects an antitrust violation, a preliminary investigation is made to determine whether a full inves-4
tigation is warranted.1 3 This preliminary investigation can entail:'
Contacting the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to avoid duplicating their efforts in pursuing this possible antitrust violation; studying
public information; searching files to see whether the Department
has previously compiled information on the suspected violator; contacting the Economic Policy Office of the Department to obtain information concerning normal competitive patterns in the industry;
and interviewing complainants and others with information.
The Department's resources prevent it from pursuing every
suspected violation.1 5 An additional factor the Department must
consider is whether an activity that may violate the antitrust laws
has sufficient impact upon the economy to warrant further action.
If the Department decides to pursue the investigation, it orders a
field investigation by its staff attorneys and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. 16
11. A. NEALE, supra note 1, at 374. One Department official commented that
the Department does "not simply prosecute violations of the law, [it] first [has] to
identify them, for antitrust crimes and violations are usually well concealed."
Reeves, supra note 4, at 356.
12. 16L J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 92.01[2][vi] (rev.
perm. ed. 1978).
13. Id. § 92.01[1].
14. Id. § 92.01[3].
15. Id.
16. Id.
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INVESTIGATIONS PRIOR TO 1962

Before 1962, the Department had four ways of obtaining information: 17 (1) It could ask prospective defendants to cooperate; (2) it
could conduct a grand jury investigation in those cases where criminal as well as civil liability could result; (3) it could ask the FTC to
investigate and turn over the information to the Department; (4) it
could file a civil complaint and then use compulsory discovery1 8 to
gather information.
None of these methods is satisfactory. The first method requires a law enforcement agency to rely upon prospective defendants to furnish evidence, sometimes against their interests. Although some companies may cooperate, many do not. 19 The
inherent limitations in this situation led the Attorney General's National Committee to conclude that "a Government agency should
not be in a position of sole dependence upon voluntary cooperation
20
for discharge of its responsibilities."
The second method is equally unsatisfactory. Grand juries investigate criminal violations of the antitrust laws. 2 1 In a civil case,
the Department may use evidence developed by a grand jury in
the course of its criminal investigation. 22 However, in United
17. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in
[1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2567, 2568-69; 107 CONG. REc. 20661 (1961)
(remarks of Sen. Kefauver); REPORT, supra note 8, at 344; Siegel, supra note 5, at
115-16; Note, supra note 5, at 240-42; 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 8590 (Apr. 4,
1977).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2567, 2568.
20. REPORT, supra note 8, at 344.
21. See FED. R. CasM. P. 7(a). The scope of the grand jury's investigatory power
is vast. The Supreme Court has stated:
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire
into violations of criminal law. No judge presides to monitor its proceedings.
It deliberates in secret and may determine alone the course of its inquiry.
The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of
witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the
conduct of criminal trials.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). For discussion of grand jury investigations of suspected antitrust violations, see Marden, From Subpoena Indictment in Criminal Antitrust Cases, 1963 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 76;
Reycraft, Criminal Antitrust Proceedings, 1963 N.Y. ST. B,A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP.
64.
22. Grand jury proceedings are secret. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628
(3d Cir. 1954). However, rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
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States v. Procter & Gamble Co. ,23 the Supreme Court held that a
grand jury is not a valid investigative tool when only civil action is
contemplated. 24 The Court noted that Congress forbids the Department to use closed proceedings to obtain information for a civil
antitrust suit. 25 Given this congressional policy against secret pro26
ceedings in civil cases, and of secrecy for grand jury proceedings,
the Court concluded that "using criminal procedures to elicit evi27
dence in a civil case ... would be flouting the policy of the law."
vides: "Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for
use in the performance of their duties." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). This has been interpreted to allow the Department to use civilly evidence developed by a grand jury
during a criminal investigation. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 61,831 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
23. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
24. Id. Certain violations of the antitrust laws, however, are subject to either
criminal or civil penalties or to both. For example, § 1 of the Sherman Act subjects a
violator to criminal action, Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); § 4 subjects this
same violator to civil action, id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4. In these cases, the decision
whether to bring a criminal or a civil action lies with the Department. Given this
choice, the Department may pursue a grand jury investigation without that action
constituting an abuse of process. The Department has chosen, however, to eschew
criminal prosecutions, except for clearly willful antitrust violations.
The Dept. has adopted the firm rule that criminal prosecutions [will be
sought] only against willful violations of the law, and that one of two conditions must appear to be shown to establish willfulness. First, if the rules of
law alleged to have been violated are clear and established--describing per
se offenses-willfulness will be presumed.... Second, if the acts of the defendants show intentional violations---through circumstantial evidence or direct testimony, it appears that the defendants knew they were violating
those laws or were acting with flagrant disregard for the legality of their
conduct-willfulness will be presumed.
Speech of Antitrust Division Chief Donald I. Baker, Antitrust Law Briefing Conference, Arlington, Virginia (Feb. 98, 1977) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND
ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967)), reprintedin 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

50,341, at 55,723 (Oct. 17, 1977) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
25. See 356 U.S. at 683 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1976)).
26. See id. at 681 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)).
27. Id. at 683. However, the Department may believe a willful violation of the
law has taken place and initiate a grand jury investigation, only to discover after the
investigation has been completed that criminal prosecution is improper. A former
chief of the Department acknowledged that this is unavoidable:
The decision whether to open a grand jury is not a decision that anything that comes out of the grand jury will be treated as a criminal case. We
initiate a grand jury when there is some reason to believe that a criminal violation may have taken place. It is inevitable that in applying that standard
we shall authorize a certain number of grand jury investigations which will
in fact lead to civil rather than criminal prosecution. That is to be expected
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There are additional roadblocks that preclude Department reliance on grand jury proceedings as a source of obtaining information for civil actions. Certain antitrust laws provide no criminal
sanctions; 28 thus, the Department cannot use a grand jury to determine whether a company has violated one of these laws. Furthermore, it is reprehensible to label individuals who may have
29
committed only civil violations prospective criminal defendants.
Thus the grand jury is both an inappropriate and insufficient source
of information upon which to proceed civilly.
The Department also cannot rely on an FTC investigation to
secure information necessary for determining whether to file suit.
The FTC has jurisdiction to examine witnesses and compel the
production of documents. 30 Although the Department can request
them to investigate corporations, 31 the FTC has the authority to
refuse the Department's request. 3 2 If the FTC does comply with

from a policy of aggressive investigation of possible criminal conduct, The
ultimate judgement on the merits whether to proceed criminally, civilly or

not at all must await the conclusion of each investigation.
Speech of Antitrust Division Chief Donald I. Baker, Antitrust Law Briefing Conference, Arlington, Virginia (Feb. 28, 1977), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1
50,341, at 55,723-24 (Oct. 17, 1977) (emphasis in original).
28. E.g., Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
29. The Attorney General's Committee stated: "We believe that the use of
criminal processes other than for investigation with an eye toward indiutment and
prosecution subverts the Department's policy of proceeding criminally only against
flagrant offenses and debases the law by tarring respectable citizens with the brush
of crime when their deeds involve no criminality." REPORT, supra note 8, at 345.
30. Federal Trade Commission Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
31. Id. § 6(c), (e), 15 U.S.C. § 46(c), (e).
32. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2596, 2600. Section 6(e) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
gives the Attorney General authority to request the FTC to investigate whether a
corporation has violated the antitrust laws; it does not expressly mandate that the
FTC comply with this request. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 6(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(e) (1976). Other sections of the same Act, however, do impose a duty on the FTC
to comply with certain requests by the Attorney General. Section 6(c) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act empowers the Attorney General to request the FTC to monitor a corporation's compliance with an antitrust decree entered by a court. Further, §
6(c) provides that "upon the application of the Attorney General it shall be [the
FTC's] duty to make such investigation." Id. § 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 46(c). Congress
phrased this provision to create a duty.
The different language in § 6(c) and (e) indicate that the FTC has discretion
when the Attorney General requests it to investigate a possible antitrust violation
pursuant to § 6(e). It is an accepted canon of construction that identical words in the
same act should be construed similarly. See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v.
United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 53 (2d ed.

1911); 2A C.
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the Department's request, the prosecutorial and investigatory functions have been split. The Department's loss of control over the investigation has a deleterious effect on both the efficiency of the
process and the ultimate success of the suit. 33 Given the problems
inherent in this approach, this third method of investigation has
34
never been used.
The final investigatory method available to the Department is
also inadequate. Once the Department files a complaint, compulsory discovery3 5 is an available investigative tool. This fourth
method suggests the Department should file a complaint without
knowing whether the Department can prove that a violation has
occurred or even if a violation has occurred at all. Given the detrimental effect the mere filing of a suit has on a corporation, this is
unfair to the innocent object of an 6unmeritorious suit. Moreover,
3
this is not the purpose of discovery.
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 53.01 (4th ed. 1973). When, however, different
words are used, different meaning is presumed. H. BLACK, supra, § 54.
33. In addition, the FTC would have to expend its resources to investigate for
the Department. Siegel, supra note 5, at 417; Note, supra note 5, at 241.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2567, 2569.
35. FED. R. CIv. P. 26-37.
36. A committee of federal judges asserted that the Department cannot substitute discovery for precomplaint investigation:
It is said that vague complaints in civil antitrust cases brought by the

Government are unavoidable, because the inquisitorial power of the Department of Justice in civil matters is inadequate and the Department's only recourse is to file complaints containing indefinite allegations and thereafter to
utilize the processes of the courts to discover the facts. . . . The Rules of
Civil Procedure relating to discovery are, of course, to be given the widest
meaning and effect, and the processes of discovery there provided are in the
nature of an investigation. But those rules have limitations and were not intended to make the courts an investigatory adjunct to the Department of
Justice.... Investigations not related to issues presented for litigation in a
pending court case, in civil matters, are no [sic] part of the judicial function,
and the compulsory processes of the judicial system should not be made available for other than judicial purposes. If a plaintiff brings bona fide charges,
it may discover such relevant evidence as the respondent possesses. It
cannot pretend to bring charges in order to discover whether actual charges
should be brought. Therefore, if, in the course of conferences prior to the
trial of a ci¢¢il action, a judge concludes that the Government . . . has no
knowledge of charges of such specificity as to permit understandable and triable statement, trial should be postponed until the lack of particularization
can be fully remedied, or the case should be dismissed.
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Report: Procedure in
Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases (Sept. 26, 1951), reprinted in Yankwich,
"Short Cuts" in Long Cases: A Commentary on the Report Entitled Procedure In
Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases Adopted by the Judicial Conference of the
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In 1955, the Attorney General's National Committee, sensitive
to the Department's lack of satisfactory means for investigating suspected civil antitrust violations, commented:
We recognize that the Department has been handicapped
and accept the . . . conclusion that present civil investigative

machinery is inadequate for effective antitrust enforcement. The
problem is, therefore, to devise a precomplaint civil discovery
process for use where civil proceedings are initially contemplated and voluntary cooperation by those under investigation
fails.

37

In 1962 Congress was finally persuaded that the available means of
investigation were inadequate and the Department was granted a
38
"precomplaint civil discovery process."
THE ANTITRUST CIVIL PROCESS ACT

On September 19, 1962, Congress enacted the Antitrust Civil
Process Act (the Act).3 9 Congress intended to provide the Department with a device for obtaining sufficient information to determine "whether or not to bring a civil antitrust suit." 40 The Act emUnited States, September 26, 1951, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62 app., at 67 (1951); accord, REPORT, supra note 8, at 344-45. See also notes 3-8 and accompanying text.

37. REPORT, supra note 8, at 345.

38. For discussion of a prior attempt to give the Department a "precomplaint
civil discovery process," see Perry & Simon, The Civil Investigative Demand: New
Fact-FindingPowersfor the Antitrust Division, 58 MICH. L. REv. 855 (1960).
39. Pub. L. No. 87-664, 76 Stat. 548 (1962) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
1311-1314 (1976)). For a collection of cases decided under the Act, see Annot., 10
A.L.R. Fed. 677 (1972 & Supp. 1977).
The Act was deemed constitutional. The fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
V. does not apply to corporations. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 468 n.2
(1976) (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1974); Grant v. United
States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906)). Thus, although a
CID, issuable only to corporations, could demand documents from a corporation that
may be self-incriminating, the fifth amendment is not violated. Hyster Co. v. United
States, 338 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1964). However, the fourth amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. IV, does apply to corporations. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541, 544 (1967); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 86 (1906). Under the Act, a CID was
required to comply with the standards applicable to grand jury subpoenas duces tecum, see notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text; such subpoenas must respect
the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, see note 55
infra. If a CID fails to satisfy fourth amendment standards, it is invalid under the
Act. In re Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
40. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2567, 2568. See also Decker, The Civil Investigative Demand,
51 KY. L.J. 449 (1963). After instituting suit, the Department could use discovery, but
could no longer issue CIDs. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 3(a),
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powered the Department to issue a civil investigative demand
(CID)for documents relevant to an antitrust investigation. 4 1 However, the CID was severely limited in scope. The Department
could demand documentary material only, 42 and it could not issue
a CID to a natural person4 3 or to a party who was not under investigation even if the party possessed relevant documents. 44
76 Stat. 548 (1962) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976)). However, during
pendency of an antitrust suit, the Department could demand documents involving
other alleged violations by the defendant. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Clark, [1968] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 86,248 (S.D.N.Y.). The Department could demand documents concerning
activities that were the subject of a simultaneous FTC investigation. In re Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 684, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Cf. In re Gold Bond
Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th
Cir. 1964) (CID issued to trading stamp company valid although FTC was
investigating trading stamp industry). Similarly, the Department could demand documents concerning activities that were the subject of a simultaneous state suit. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Justice, 344 F. Supp. 9, 11-12
(E.D. Mich. 1971), affd, 467 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1972). The Department could demand documents in a party's possession, even though the documents did not originate with the party. In re Emprise Corp., 344 F. Supp. 319, 323 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
Although "[tihe purpose of [the Act was] to enable the Department of Justice to
obtain documentary evidence during the course of a civil investigation to enforce the
antitrust laws," H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2567, 2568, the Department could use evidence obtained
in response to a CID in a criminal action, Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No.
87-664 §§ 4(d), 7, 76 Stat. 548 (1962) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 9§ 1311 (Savings
Clause note), 1313(d) (1976)).
41. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 3(a), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976)).
42. Id. The Act defined "documentary material" to include, among others, "the
original or any copy of any . . . record." Id. § 2(g) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
1311(g) (1976)). In Material Handling Inst., Inc. v. McLaren, 426 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970), the court found that "documentary material" encompassed addressograph plates. The court reasoned: "[I]t would be a subversion of
the Act's clear intent to allow a business entity to insulate its records from appropriate investigation by the use of modern information storage techniques." Id. at 93.
43. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 2(f), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (1976)).
44. Id. § 3(a) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976)). The conference
committee approved restricting the issuance of CIDs to parties under investigation:
The purpose of the civil investigative demand bill is to provide the Department of Justice with a much-needed tool for the fair, effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.
While a limitation of the civil investigative demand procedure to
companies "under investigation" may somewhat restrict the use of this procedure by exempting companies in no way involved in a subject under inquiry by the Department, the essential purpose of the bill is clearly still fulfilled, for the civil investigative demand procedure will be available to the
Department where a company is involved in a matter under investigation by
the Department.
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The Department could issue a CID only when investigating a
past or present antitrust violation. A CID was limited to documents relevant to a civil "antitrust investigation." 4 5 The Act defined
an "antitrust investigation" as "an inquiry conducted by any antitrust investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or has been engaged in any antitrust violation." 4 6 An "antitrust violation" was defined as "any act or omission in violation of
any antitrust law or any antitrust order."4 7 Thus, the Department
could demand documents concerning activities that had violated or
were violating an antitrust law or order; the Department was not
empowered to issue CIDs to those suspected of future violations. 4 8
A CID recipient was required to make requested documents
available for inspection and reproduction by the Department.4 9 If
H.R. REP. No. 2291, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin [1962J U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2572, 2573-74.
45. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 3(a), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976)).
46. Id. § 2(c) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976)).
47. Id. § 2(d) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1311(d) (1976)).
48. In United States v. Union Oil Co., 343 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1965), the Department issued a CID to obtain documents relating to a proposed acquisition. The court
set aside the CID, holding that the Department could not issue a CID to investigate
a possible future antitrust violation. Id. at 30-31.
49. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 4(b), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1976)). If the recipient refused to make requested documents available, the Department could petition a district court to compel production. Id. § 5(a) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1976)). The Department could petition in any judicial district where the recipient resided, was found,
or transacted business. If the recipient transacted business in more than one judicial
district, the Department could petition in the judicial district where the recipient
maintained his or her principal place of business or, with the recipient's consent, in
any judicial district where the recipient transacted business. Id.
Any final order the court entered could be appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291 (1976). Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 5(d), 76 Stat. 548
(1962) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1314(d) (1976)). If the recipient disobeyed a final order of the court, such disobedience was punishable as contempt. Id. Moreover,
if the recipient willfully destroyed documents subject to a CID to avoid producing
them, the recipient faced criminal penalties. Id. § 6 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
1505 (1976)).
Documents produced by a CID recipient were placed under the control of the
Department's designated custodian. Id. § 4(b) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1313(b)
(1976)). The custodian's duties are detailed in regulations promulgated by the Department. 28 C.F.R. §§ 49.1-.4 (1979). If the custodian did not perform his or her duties, the CID recipient could compel performance by petitioning the district court in
the judicial district where the custodian's office was located for an order compelling
performance. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 5(c), 76 Stat. 548
(1962) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1314(c) (1976)).
Only Department employees had access to documents received in response to a
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there is an objection to the demand the recipient can petition a
federal district court to modify or set aside the CID. 50 A successful
challenge could "be based upon any failure of [the CID] to comply
with the provisions of [the] Act, or upon any constitutional or other
legal right or privilege of [the recipient]." 5 1
To judge the validity of CIDs, the Act adopted the standards
for determining the legitimacy of subpoenas duces tecum issued in
grand jury proceedings. 52 A CID could not demand documents
privileged from disclosure, 53 nor contain any requirement not
permitted in a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. 54 Moreover, a
subpoena duces tecum issued to a corporation under investigation
CID.

Id. § 4(c) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1976)); 28 C.F.R. § 49.3

(1979). The Senate proposed that any agency that administers antitrust laws have access to such documents. In conference, however, access was limited to Department
employees. H.R. REP. No. 2291, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2573. The conferees declared: "[T]he basic aim of
the bill is not frustrated by denying the Department of Justice the right to make
available to the Federal Trade Commission documents obtained by the civil investigative demand procedure." Id., reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2574.

50. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 5(b), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976)). The CID recipient was required to
petition within 20 days after service unless the CID had an earlier return date. Id.
The recipient was required to petition a district court in the judicial district where
the recipient resided, was found, or transacted business. Id. Any final order the court
entered could be appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 5(d), 76 Stat. 548 (1962) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
1314(d) (1976)).
51. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 5(b), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976)).
52. See id. § 3(c) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c) (1976)).
53. Id. § 3(c)(2) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c)(2) (1976)). The Supreme
Court has stated:
Although the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to
the supervision of a judge, the longstanding principle that "the public...
has a right to every man's evidence," except for those persons protected by a
constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege,... is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted);
accord, United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976). Thus, the Department
had access to all documents except those protected by a "constitutional, commonlaw, or statutory privilege." A CID recipient could submit any documents believed
privileged to the district court in camera. The district court would decide whether
the documents were privileged from disclosure. See Amateur Softball Ass'n of
America v. United States, 467 F.2d 312, 316 (10th Cir. 1972); In re Gold Bond Stamp
Co., 221 F. Supp. 391, 399 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th
Cir. 1964).
54. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 3(c)(1), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c)(1) (1976)).
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by a grand jury for a possible antitrust violation is required to
satisfy the fourth amendment "test of reasonableness"; 55 CIDs

were held to this same standard. 56 In addition, a CID could not be
57

issued for an "improper" motive.
A CID was subject to certain other requirements. Requested
documents had to be described "with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified." 5 8 A CID
was required to "state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust violation which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto. ' '59 Furthermore, the return date had
55. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906). Corporations may claim fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, including those contained in a subpoena duces tecum. Id.
While a search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law, and a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner, still .... the substance of the offense is the compulsory production of private papers, whether under a search warrant or a subpoena duces tecum, against which the
person, be he individual or corporation, is entitled to protection.
Id.
56. In one case, the court found a CID reasonable because
the burden which is imposed upon [the CID recipient] is substantially
the same as that which would inure to a litigant against whom the Government has commenced an action under one of the sections of the antitrust
laws, and discovery proceedings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were utilized. [Sic].
In re Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391, 399 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd per
curiam, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964). The court's ruling is reasonable because the
Department could have filed suit for violation of the antitrust laws and then discovered these documents. This result avoids forcing the Department to engage in discovery fishing expeditions, a major reason for granting the Department CID power.
See notes 3-8 supra and accompanying text.
57. In re Emprise Corp., 344 F. Supp. 319, 321 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). One court
commented:
If the [CID recipient] can establish that the investigation was launched
not in a bona fide attempt to determine whether or not a violation occurred
but rather to pay off a political debt or in response to outside political interference and pressure, this smacks of the type of abuse which would be condemned when tested by the standards applicable to the proper issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum issued in aid of a grand jury investigation.
In re Cleveland Trust Co., [1972] Trade Cas. (CCH) 92,120, 92,122 (N.D. Ohio
1969). Accord, Chattanooga Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Justice,
358 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1966).
58. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 3(b)(2), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A) (1976)).
59. Id. § 3(b)(1) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (b)(1) (1976)). This statement necessarily is in general terms. CIDs serve as investigative tools. The Department uses them to determine whether there has been an antitrust violation and, if so,
the nature of the violation. Consequently, when preparing a CID, the Department
often lacks sufficient' information to draft a detailed statement. One court com-
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to allow "a reasonable period of time within which the material so
60
demanded may be assembled and made available."
In federal district court proceedings involving CIDs, those
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) consistent with the
Act's provisions governed procedure. 6 ' The FRCP provide district
courts authority to issue protective orders. 6 2 Thus, issuance of a
properly framed protective order in appropriate circumstances is
63
consistent with the Act's provisions.
The Act greatly expanded the government's precomplaint investigatory powers by allowing CIDs to be issued in appropriate
instances. However, Congress limited the Department's CID
power until this new investigative tool could be further evaluated. 64 In 1976, after observing the operation of the Act, Congress
mented: "The test.., must be whether the statement in the demand as to the nature
of the conduct under investigation is sufficient to inform adequately the person being investigated and sufficient to determine the relevancy of the documents demanded for inspection." In re Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391, 397 (D.
Minn. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964) (emphasis in original).
60. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 3(b)(3), 76 Stat. 548 (1962)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(3)(B)(1976)).
61. Id. § 5(e) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1314(e) (1976)). Discussing proceedings to modify or set aside a CID and the impact of § 5(e), one court stated:
By reason of the filing of the petition to modify or set aside the demand, the
action before the Court constitutes a proceeding under the law wherein the
Court is required to determine whether or not the civil investigative demand should be enforced. Such determination is an adversary proceeding
and the Court must do more than rubber stamp the Attorney General's determination of the validity of its own demand....
Section 5(e) of the Antitrust Civil Process Act makes the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure applicable to any proceeding in a district court to modify
or set aside a civil investigative demand.
In re Cleveland Trust Co., [1972] Trade Cas. (CCH) 92,120, 92,121 (N.D. Ohio
1969). Thus, the court determined that § 5(e) mandates that the FRCP, if consistent
with the Act, govern proceedings to modify or set aside a CID. As another court
stated: "Section 5(e) by its terms is purely supplementary." In re Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
63. In Upjohn Co. v. Bernstein, [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) 82,807 (D.D.C.), the
Department had received documents containing trade secrets in response to a CID
and had finished its investigation and contemplated no further action. Under these
circumstances, the court decided that it was proper to place restrictions on the Department's handling of the documents. Id. at 82,808.
64. Upon enactment of the Act, one Senator commented:
It is the intention of Senators who considered the bill [which became the
Act] that the remedies afforded by the bill shall make it unnecessary to consider conferring additional authority on the Attorney General, as has been
requested from time to time, until such time as the bill, when enacted into
law, shall have been thoroughly tested and tried.
107 CONG. REc. 20662 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
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concluded that the Department's power needed further expan65
sion.
THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT

In 1976, Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 (the Amendments), 66 expanding the Department's precomplaint investigatory power. By extending this
power, the Department's enforcement of the antitrust laws is aided
and there is less danger that unmeritorious suits which injure innocent defendants will be filed. 67 The Department can now compel
65. The Attorney General explained to Congress:
Insofar as it went, enactment in 1962 of the Antitrust Civil Process Act provided a signal benefit to the Government's civil investigations by authorizing production of relevant documents from corporations, associations,
partnerships, or other legal entities not natural persons, under investigation.
But the limitations on the scope of the demand have left the Act far from
meeting essential investigatory needs of the Department's Antitrust Division.
The refusal of industry sometimes to cooperate voluntarily in antitrust
investigations, which gave rise to the Antitrust Civil Process Act, is the reason today that more effective civil discovery means are needed. The same
reasons that supported enactment of the Civil Process Act speak for the Act's
expansion.
H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 22 (letter from Att'y Gen. Edward H.
Levi), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2616.

66. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314
(1976)). For discussion of the Amendments and their legislative history, see Scher,
Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
679 (1977).
67. Upon signing the Amendments into law, President Ford commented that
the Amendments "will significantly expand the civil investigatory powers of the Antitrust Division. This will enable the Department of Justice not only to bring additional antitrust cases that would otherwise have escaped prosecution, but it will also
better assure that unmeritorious suits will not be filed." Statement by the President
on Signing H.R. 8532 Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1423, 1424 (Sept.
30, 1976). The House committee concurred in the President's belief that the Amendments would prove a great benefit to antitrust enforcement. The House committee
report stated:
[The Amendments] should be the instrument of more enlightened antitrust
enforcement, since the thorough pre-complaint investigations this bill will
authorize would in many cases disclose facts that would lead the [Department] to file no action whatsoever. In fact, this often happens with CID investigations under the present 1962 Act. The [Department's] figures reveal
that approximately 1300 of the 1600 CIDs for documents it has issued since
1962 ultimately resulted in no action, and many of these 1300 investigations
conclusively and clearly vindicated potential defendants.
In each of these many cases, the CID process has benefitted everyone--the courts, the [Department], and the potential defendants. The more
thorough precomplaint investigations that [the Amendments] will make possible will yield similar benefits in the future.
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natural persons to turn over relevant information and documents
and to give written and oral testimony. 68 CIDs can be issued to investigate anticipated mergers or acquisitions prior to the occurrence of any violation. 69 Further, the amended Act allows the Department to issue CIDs to any party possessing relevant information
70
or documents, whether or not the party is under investigation.
NaturalPersons
Under the 1962 Act, the Department could not issue CIDs to
natural persons. 71 The Amendments remove this restriction, enabling the Department to obtain documents from employees of a
corporation when the documents are not retained by the corporation itself.72 Moreover, the Department can obtain information
from shareholders of a close corporation, who may possess docu73
ments relevant to the investigation.
Deposition Authority
The Amendments grant the Department authority to compel a
CID recipient to answer written questions or to appear for oral examination before a Department investigator. 74 Under the Act, CID
authority was limited to documentary materials only. 75 The CID's
expanded scope aids investigations where necessary information
cannot be obtained from documents alone. 7 6 Examination of documents may produce an ambiguous and inconclusive picture. 77 Prior
H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2596, 2602.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311(f), 1312(a) (1976).
69. Id. § 1311(c).
70. Id. § 1312(a).
71. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.

72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (1976).
73.

S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1976). Because a recipient can

base an objection to a CID upon a constitutional or other legal right or privilege,
including the privilege against self-incrimination, see notes 90 & 91 infra and accom-

panying text, the fourth and fifth amendments are not violated.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976).
75. See note.42 supra and accompanying text.
76. Antitrust Civil Process Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 39 Before the

Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975) (statement of Thomas E. Kauper) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 39 Hearings].
77. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 23-24 (letter from Ass't Att'y
Gen. Thomas E. Kauper), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596,

2618. Before enactment of the Amendments, only Department employees could inspect documents received in response to a CID. See note 49 supra. Now, however,
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to the Amendments the Department was forced to rely upon a corporation's voluntary compliance with Department requests to question the corporation's officials and employees to eliminate ambiguities; often these corporations would not cooperate. 7 8 Prior
to adoption of the Amendments, the Assistant Attorney General for
the Antitrust Division testified to Congress that granting the Department deposition authority would greatly alleviate this problem.

79

Allowing the Department deposition authority reduces waste.
Prior to the Amendments, both the Department and the corporation under investigation wasted countless hours: The corporation
had to find requested documents; the Department had to examine
them. In a deposition, a question can be answered quickly, avoid80
ing much of this cost.
Furthermore, deposition authority facilitates effective law enforcement. If a company has an unwritten policy that violates the
antitrust laws, the Department needs deposition authority to prove
that the policy exists;8 ' if a company destroys relevant documents
the Department may use documents received in response to a CID "in connection
with the taking of oral testimony." 15 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1976). Thus, the Department can examine documents and then question witnesses to resolve ambiguities.
If documents were produced in response to a CID issued under the Act, they
could not be disclosed to third parties. Under the amended Act, if the Department
issues a second CID to obtain the same documents, this time free of any prohibition
against disclosing them to third parties "in connection with the taking of oral testimony," the CID recipient may be entitled to an order prohibiting such disclosure.
Aluminum Co. of America v. United States Dep't of Justice, 444 F. Supp. 1342
(D.D.C. 1978). Because the CID recipient had relied upon the statutory prohibition
against disclosure in effect when initially producing the documents, the CID recipient would not have had a "meaningful opportunity to object to possible disclosure to
third parties." Id. at 1347.
78. H.R. 39 Hearings,supra note 76, at 26 (statement of Thomas E. Kauper).
79. See H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 23-24 (letter from Ass't
Att'y Gen. Thomas E. Kauper), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2596, 2618.
80. Two witnesses at the Senate hearings commented: "Allowing documentary
discovery but not pre-complaint oral depositions puts a perverse premium on the
most burdensome form of legal communication-as firms receiving CIDs often delay
and then unload truckloads of documents on a stretched-out antitrust Division staff."
The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 146, 147 (1975) (statement of Ralph Nader and Mark Green) [hereinafter cited
as S. 1284 Hearings];accord, H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 24 (letter
from Ass't Att'y Gen. Thomas E. Kauper), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2596, 2618.
81. Commenting on the Department's need for deposition authority, the House
committee stated:
[Wihile the [Department] can compel the submission of documents during
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before receiving a CID, depositions are needed to obtain the information previously contained in the documents. 8 2 The Departmenfs
deposition authority thus serves two important functions: It enables
the Department to resolve ambiguities and to obtain information
not otherwise available.8 3
Right to Counsel
"CID recipients have an unlimited right to counsel while
preparing their responses to CIDs for documents and answers to
written interrogatories." 84 If the Department demands an oral examination, counsel may accompany the CID recipient and advise
him or her during the examination.8 5 Congress had considered a
more limited right to counsel for CID recipients, 86 but rejected
this proposal, granting CID recipients the same right to counsel
for depositions8 7 as is granted for depositions taken under the
Administrative Procedure Act 88 or the Federal Trade Commission
investigations of possible Sherman Act violations, documents may be inconclusive by themselves, or non-existent. Corporations have become very sophisticated about not creating or preserving documentary evidence. In such
cases, oral testimony and answers to written interrogatories offer the only
means of ascertaining the relevant facts.
H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2596, 2601.

82. Generally, before issuing a CID, the Department seeks information informally. Although federal law prohibits destruction of documents requested in a CID, it
prohibits such destruction only after the CID is received. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505
(1976). Thus, a potential CID recipient can destroy relevant documents after learning
of an informal investigation but before receiving a CID. Because the documents no
longer exist, the Department needs deposition authority to obtain the information
they contained. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 24 (letter from Ass't
Att'y Gen. Thomas E. Kauper), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

2596, 2618-19. Cf. Fricano, How Trade Association Executives Can Limit Their Exposure to Antitrust Division Discovery Procedures, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 365, 373-75
(1977) (suggesting that trade associations diminish vulnerability to CIDs by reducing
amount of records they keep, giving all records to accountants and members of association).
83. S.REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976).
84. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 2596, 2602.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(7)(A) (1976).
86. Commenting upon an early proposal, the Department stated: "A major objective of the bill [which became the Amendments], the production of oral testimony, would be obtained by a somewhat modified Administrative Procedure Act
process providing the presence of the witness' counsel in a limited role with a restricted right to raise objections." Department of Justice Report (Mar. 5, 1975), reprinted in H.R. 39 Hearings,supra note 76, at 185, 185 (emphasis added).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 & n.10, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 2596, 2602-03 & n.10.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976). This statute provides in pertinent part: "'A person
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Rules.8 9 Thus precedents under these authorities are helpful in
determining the scope of a CID recipient's right to counsel.
Right to Refuse to Comply with a CID
A CID recipient's refusal to answer a question or produce requested documents will be upheld only if a constitutional or other
legal right or privilege, including the privilege against selfincrimination, provides a basis for refusal.9 0 A refusal to answer
compelled to appear in person before an agency or representative thereof is entitled
to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel .... " Id.
In Wanderer v. Kaplan, [1962] Trade Cas. (CCH) 77,159 (D.D.C.), the court
found that applying the Administrative Procedure Act to FTC investigations mandates that: (1) The person under investigation has the right to have counsel present
when testifying; (2) counsel have the right to object to improper questions; (3) counsel have the right to present on the record the grounds for objection; and (4) counsel
have the right to advise the witness of the propriety of answering a question. Id. at
77,160-61. A CID recipient's right to counsel encompasses these essentials. For further discussion of the right to counsel in administrative hearing, see Annot., 33
A.L.R.3d 229 (1970 & Supp. 1977).
89. 16 C.F.R. § 2.9 (1979). This rule provides that a witness may have counsel
accompany and advise him or her. Counsel may object to questions and advise the
witness of the propriety of answering a question. Counsel may state the grounds for
the witness' refusal to answer a question. However, counsel may not interrupt examination of the witness to object to the investigation, to subpoenas that produced the
witness, or to the FTC's authority to investigate. Id. In Mead Corp., 62 F.T.C. 1467
(1963), the FTC examined the scope to be given the right to counsel in FTC investigations. In a criminal trial, the defendant has the right to representation by counsel.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The FTC distinguished its investigations from criminal
trials:
"The Federal Trade Commission could not conduct an efficient investigation
if persons being investigated were permitted to convert the investigation
into a trial." In its very nature, an investigative hearing is an ex parte, not an
adversary, proceeding. The purpose of an investigation is to obtain information, and it is the Commission which has the primary responsibility for
deciding what information it needs and from what sources it should be elicited.
62 F.T.C. at 1470. (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 446 (1960)). The FTC
further reasoned: "A reasonable balance must be struck between two legitimate interests, that of administrative efficiency in conducting non-public pre-adjudicative investigations and that of proper representation by counsel of witnesses compelled to
testify in such investigations." Id. at 1469. The FTC noted the dangers involved in
allowing counsel to participate: Opportunities to delay or obstruct the investigation
may arise and some lawyers may seize them. Id. at 1470. However, the FTC determined: "If dilatory or obstructionist tactics should be encountered, they must be
dealt with sternly. But, to deal with such tactics, it is neither necessary nor desirable
that the right to counsel be denied." Id. Based upon this reasoning, the FTC promulgated its rules concerning the right to counsel in FTC investigations. See id. at 1472
n.5.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(7)(A) (1976). The Amendments have modified the procedure for petitioning that existed under the Act. Now, the Department may extend, in
writing, the time a recipient has to file a petition to modify or set aside a CID. Id. §
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based on an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination must yield, however, if the Department grants the recipient
immunity and then orders him or her to testify. 91 An improper refusal to answer questions or produce documents is subject to jua United States district
dicial action. The Department can petition
92
court for an order compelling compliance.
The amended Act affords other protections for CID recipients.
All grand jury subpoena and subpoena duces tecum standards continue to apply to determine the validity of a CID. Section
1312(c)(1) provides that if, in a grand jury investigation, the Department cannot obtain documents or information with a subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum, the Department cannot obtain these
93
documents or this information with a CID in a civil investigation.
Section 1312(c)(2) provides that "standards applicable to discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" 94 apply to CIDs only to the extent that they are appropriate to and
consistent with the amended Act's provisions and purposes. 95 To
ascertain which civil discovery standards apply to determine the
validity of a CID, legislative history must be examined.
The language of section 1312(c)(2) must be analyzed carefully.
This section provides that those civil discovery standards equiva1314(b). A CID recipient may petition a federal district court to set aside or mod-

ify the CID. Id. The recipient need not comply with those portions of the CID
deemed objectionable. Id. However, the CID recipient must object to specific
portions of the CID, and cannot object in general, thereby attempting total noncompliance. 122 CONG. REC. H10,292 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(7)(B) (1976). If a CID recipient intends to assert the
privilege against self-incrimination, it is more efficient if he or she informs the investigator prior to an oral examination. To grant immunity, the investigator must obtain
the Assistant Attorney General's approval. If the recipient waits until the oral examination to assert the privilege, the investigator must obtain the Assistant Attorney
General's approval before immunity can be granted. After obtaining this approval,
the investigator must reschedule the examination. Thus, everyone is inconvenienced.
Reeves, supra note 4, at 360.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1976). See note 49 supra. The Amendments have
changed slightly the procedure for enforcing a CID. Under the Act, if a recipient
transacted business in more than one judicial district, the Department could petition
only in the judicial district where the recipient maintained his or her principal place
of business or, if the recipient consented, in any other judicial district where the recipient transacted business. However, the Amendments remove this restriction. See
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 104(a),
90 Stat. 1383 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1970)). Now, the Department may petition in any judicial district where the recipient resides, is found, or transacts business. 15 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1976).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c)(1) (1976).
94. Id. § 1312(c)(2).
95. Id.
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lent to grand jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum standards,
modified to take into account differences between civil and criminal investigations, apply to determine the validity of a CID. However, because of the similarity between a criminal investigation and
a civil antitrust investigation, modification will rarely change the
standard. Rather this provision furnishes a "safety valve" to allow a
court flexibility in rare instances only.
In addition, section 1312(c)(2) provides that those civil discovery procedural dictates appropriate to and consistent with the
amended Act's purposes and procedural dictates apply. In its report, the House committee explained the reason for this provision:
The 1962 Antitrust Civil Process Act expressly incorporated
the "grand jury subpoena" standard of protection for CID recipients. But that Act did not clearly authorize CID objections under the "civil discovery" standard set forth in this bill. Instead,
section 5(e) of the 1962 Act merely provided that "the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to any petition under this
Act." But this language is ambiguous: It is not clear whether it
makes the "civil discovery" standards available only if civil discovery is attempted in the course of and ancillary to court
disputes over CIDs, or whether, in addition, it means that CID
recipients can raise the same objections to CIDs that civil litigants can raise against civil discovery requests. Legislative history and court decisions under the 1962 Act fail to provide guidance. Thus, in order to resolve this doubt in favor of protecting
CID recipients, the Committee adopted the express language of
section [1312(c)].
Consequently, CID recipients will be permitted to premise
objections not only on the basis of precedents under the 1962
Act, but also on the basis of precedents under the grand jury
subpoena standard and the civil discovery standard as well. 96
Although the committee decided that civil discovery standards
apply to determine the validity of a CID in appropriate cases, it
understood that these standards are not always applicable. 9 7 The
amended Act states that to be applicable, civil discovery standards
must be "appropriate and consistent with the provisions and purposes [of the amended Act]." 9 8 The committee report adds that
96. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2604.

97. See id. at 11, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2606.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis added). The House committee
noted: "[T]he application of civil discovery standards [must] be 'appropriate' and
'consistent' with the purpose of [the amended Act], which is to increase the effect-
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civil discovery standards that conflict with the amended Act's procedural dictates are not "appropriate and consistent with the provisions" of the amended Act. 99 Therefore, civil discovery standards
that conflict with the amended Act's procedural provisions do not
apply to determine the validity of a CID.
Civil discovery standards must be appropriate and consistent
with both the provisions and purposes of the amended Act. The
iveness of antitrust investigations. As long as this qualification is recognized, the federal judiciary may treat objections to CIDs much like objections [to] civil discovery
requests." H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG.

& AD.NEWS 2596, 2606.

99. The procedural dictates of the amended Act may conflict with the procedural dictates of the FRCP. The House committee report cites two examples of possible conflict between the procedural requirements of the FRCP and those of the
amended Act. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2607.
As its first example, the committee report notes that the FRCP permit oral examinations only after a complaint has been filed. Id. A CID is a precomplaint investigative tool; therefore, the amended Act does not authorize issuance of a CID demanding an oral examination after a complaint has been filed. See 15 U.S.C. §
1312(a) (1976). Here, as the report suggests, H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2607, the procedural dictates of the FRCP and the amended Act conflict.
However, notwithstanding their assertion to the contrary, the House committee's
second example does not describe conflict between the procedural dictates of the
FRCP and those of the amended Act. The report notes that the FRCP provide: "A
party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give
reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action." Id. (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 30(b)(1)). These other parties may attend the oral examination and crossexamine the witness "as permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence." FED. R. Cxv. P. 30(c). However, the amended Act forbids attendance at an oral examination pursuant to a CID by other than the officer before
whom the testimony is to be taken, the stenographer, the witness, and the witness'
counsel. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(2) (1976). With respect to this last example, the House
committee report acknowledges: "[N]on-witnesses are not formal 'parties' to an investigation." H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2607. Thus, even under the FRCP, they have no
right to be notified, or to cross-examine witnesses. Therefore, these provisions of the
FRCP and those of the amended Act do not conflict.
Section 1312(c)(2) does not incorporate those requirements of the FRCP that
conflict with the amended Act. Incorporating them would place the Department in
an untenable position: If the Department followed the procedure dictated by the
FRCP, the Department would violate the amended Act; if the Department followed
the procedure dictated by the amended Act, the Department would violate the
amended Act as read to include all procedures dictated by the FRCP. The Department could not proceed. The committee stated "That is why section 1312(c)(2) requires that objections against CIDs raised under the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be 'appropriate' and 'consistent with the provisions' of
the Antitrust Civil Process Act." Id. at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2607. Thus, if the Department obeys the amended Act's procedural dictates, the CID recipient cannot object to the Department's procedure.
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terms "provisions" and "purposes" must have independent meaning or the statute would be redundant. 10 0 Thus, in addition to
those standards that conflict with the amended Act's procedural
dictates, certain substantive civil discovery standards do not apply
to determine validity of a CID. The House committee report furnishes guidance in evaluating which substantive civil discovery
standards do apply. The report details restrictions on CIDs that the
committee thought desirable. 1 1 These restrictions are designed to
prevent unreasonable and oppressive demands. They restrict a
CID from being too broad and sweeping or from being used to secure privileged communications. These restrictions also ensure
that the CID not involve too great a burden of compliance. The
demand must be limited to a reasonable time period, sufficiently
detailed to inform the recipient what is demanded, be relevant to a
specific investigation, and be issued in good faith. For each of
10 2
these restrictions, the report supplies precedents.
Each precedent cited involves a challenge to a grand jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, or a CID whose validity was determined under these same standards. None of the precedents
concerns a civil discovery request. Thus applying only those substantive civil discovery standards that are equivalent to grand jury
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum standards provides the substantive restrictions on CIDs that the House committee desires.
This is appropriate. Only those substantive civil discovery
standards that correspond to grand jury subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum standards should apply to CIDs. These substantive
standards balance the need for effective law enforcement against
the need for freedom from unreasonable demands.' 0 3 Civil discov100. It is presumed that Congress intends each word it uses to have meaning.
See, e.g., Abbot v. Bralove, 176 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1949); H. BLAcK, supra note
32, § 54.
101. See H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2604-06. In addition, the committee thought
that CID recipients should be able to obtain protective orders against disclosure of
trade secrets furnished to the Department in response to a CID. The committee
cited Upjohn Co. v. Bernstein, [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) 82,807 (D.D.C.), as support
for the proposition that the Act provides this protection for CID recipients already,
H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 n.17, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2605 n.17. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
102. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 nn.11-16 & 18-22, 11 nn.2328, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2596, 2605 nn.11-16 & 18-22,
2606 nn.23-28.
103. Aluminum Co. of America v. United States Dep't of Justice, 444 F. Supp.
1342, 1346 (D.D.C. 1978); H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in
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ery standards are designed for civil trials, which are formal, adversary, adjudicatory proceedings. Civil trials have detailed pleadings
that define the issues. CIDs are designed for investigations,
which necessarily must be broader in scope. Thus the standards of
materiality and relevancy can be stricter for civil discovery than for
an investigation to determine whether a statute has been violated1 0 4 and many restrictions upon discovery should not apply to
05

CIDs.1

CIDs aid civil antitrust investigations as subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum aid grand jury investigations. A determination
whether a demand contained in a CID is reasonable properly
should be made in a manner similar to that for determining
whether a demand contained in a grand jury subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum is reasonable. Grand jury subpoena and subpoena duces tecum standards are designed to invalidate unreasonable and
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2596, 2602 ("[Tlhe need for effective law en-

forcement must be balanced against the rights of businesses and individuals to' be
free from unwarranted and unreasonable government intrusion.").
104. See, e.g., FTC v. Gibson Products, Inc., 569 F.2d 900, 904 n.9 (5th Cir.
1978); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 873-74 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 974 (1977); Westside Ford, Inc. v. United States, 206 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir.
1953); Hagen v. Porter, 156 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 729
(1946); FTC v. Green, 252 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). To commence and conduct an investigation, whether by a grand jury of a possible crime or by an administrative agency of a possible civil violation, an offense and an offender need not be
known; the case-or-controversy requirement applicable to civil discovery does not
apply to these cases. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
See also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 65 (1906). All that is inquired into is whether a violation of a statute has
occurred, and it is by this standard that materiality and relevancy are judged. FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 873-74 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977). The court in Texaco stated:
Where, as here, no complaint has yet been formulated and the issues have
therefore not yet been crystallized, some courts have concluded that an attenuated standard of relevance is appropriate. In our view, however, the better approach is simply to recognize that in the pre-complaint stage, an
investigating agency is under no obligation to propound a narrowly focused
theory of a possible future case. Accordingly, the relevance of the agency's
subpoena requests may be measured only against the general purposes of its
investigation. The district court is not free to speculate about the possible
charges that might be included in a future complaint, and then to determine
the relevance of the subpoena requests by reference to those hypothetical
charges. The court must not lose sight that the agency is merely exercising
its legitimate right to determine the facts, and that a complaint may not, and
need not, ever issue.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
105. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2606.
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oppressive investigatory demands 10 6 and are sufficiently protective
07
of the rights of CID recipients.'
The House committee, while recognizing that CIDs and grand
jury subpoenas should satisfy similar standards, acknowledged that
the nature of a civil investigation differs from that of a criminal investigation and opined that standards for judging a civil investigation may differ from those for judging a criminal investigation:
Thus, the grand jury subpoena standard, tailored as it is to
reflect the broader scope and less precise nature of investigations, may in this one respect seem to be a more appropriate
standard for antitrust investigations than a rigidly-applied, postcomplaint civil discovery standard would be. Yet it seems
equally inappropriate to apply only a criminal, grand jury
standard to civil investigations, conducted under the [amended
08
Act].
The House committee did not elaborate on the need for different standards for civil and criminal investigations. Possible justifications for broad investigatory powers in the criminal context include society's great stake in detecting and punishing violations of
the criminal law, and prevention of the harsh consequences that inure to a defendant when criminal charges are erroneously filed.
When, however, the civil investigation concerns a suspected antitrust violation, these same policies justify the need for a thorough
investigation.
106. The limitations on the scope of a subpoena duces tecum may be summarized as follows. It must not be too broad and sweeping. The documents
sought must have some materiality to the investigation. The subpoena must
be limited to a reasonable time. The documents must be described with sufficient definiteness so that the witness may know what is wanted. The burdensomeness of compliance must not be too great. A subpoena may not be
used to secure privileged documents.
The tests of reliance and materiality are tests "of broader content in
their use as to a grand jury investigation than in their use as to the evidence
of a trial."
Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, in 22 F.R.D. 343, 428 (1959) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 833 (1956)).
107. Most of these standards have constitutional origins, and stem from the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizure." But such subpoenas must also conform to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(c), which provides that a court may quash or modify the
subpoena--or, under this bill, a CID-if compliance would be "unreasonable or oppressive."
H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2596, 2605 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 11-12, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS at 2606.
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Standards used to judge civil antitrust investigations should
parallel those used to judge criminal investigations. Except in rare
cases, the policy considerations that delineate the scope of a grand
jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum apply equally to the context of a civil antitrust suit. Therefore, to determine whether a substantive civil discovery standard should apply in judging a CID,
one must determine whether it is equivalent to a grand jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum standard.
The legislative history in the Senate furnishes support for this
construction of section 1312(c)(2). After passage in the Senate of the
bill which became the Admendments, Senator Hart read a statement of intent and effect into the Congressional Record. 10 9 Regarding applicability of the substantive standards of the FRCP to
CIDs, he stated:
The purpose of including [section 1312(c)(2)] is to make available to CID recipients the appropriate substantive standards limiting discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Those standards, which may be found in Rule 26(c), authorize a
court to protect a person from oppression or undue burden....
[O]ther standards in Rule 26(c) such as annoyance and embarrassment, which are appropriate concerns in the discovery context where information may readily become public, are not valid
concerns under the CID statute....
• . .We view the FRCP standard [in section 1312(c)(2)] as
essentially incorporating the "oppressive" and "burdensome"
standards of Rule 26(c). So limited, this standard is consistent
with the purposes underlying the Act ....
"10
The Senator commented: "[S]uch a limitation is already embodied in
the grand jury standard." 1 1 Senator Hart stated that only FRCP
substantive standards equivalent to grand jury subpoena and subpoena duces tecum standards apply to determine validity
of a CID. 11 2 The House committee viewed section 1312(c)(2) as
109. See 122 CONG. REC. S15,416 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Hart).
110. Id.; accord, id. at S15,420 (remarks of Sen. Percy) (section 1312(c)(2) contains procedural safeguards ensuring greater procedural fairness).
111. Id. at S15,416 (remarks of Sen. Hart).
112. In a statement made before § 1312(c)(2) was included in the bill which became the Amendments, see S.1284, 94th Cong., ist Sess. § 201(e), S. 1284 Hearings,
supra note 80, at 7, Senator Hart apparently declared that FRCP substantive
standards were fully applicable to CIDs, even without § 1312(c)(2):
[Elvery single objection that is available under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can properly be
raised against any CID. This is borne out by a review of the massive case
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incorporating grand jury subpoena and subpoena duces tecum
standards but suggested these criminal standards may need to be
modified in the civil context. As discussed previously, however,
the policies delineating the scope of grand jury subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum are equally applicable in the antitrust context
in most instances. 113 Thus it would seem this modification provision
would have little practical effect and except in rare instances the
same result would be reached under Senator Hart's and the House
committee's views of section 1312(c)(2).
Senator Hart detailed seven factors to be considered in
determining whether a FRCP substantive standard applies to determine validity of a CID. 1 14 These factors emphasize that the nalaw on permissible objections to grand jury subpenas [sicj, and a review of
the reported cases dealing with objections to CID's issued since 1962 under
[the Act].
122 CONG. REc. S8268 (daily ed. May 28, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hart). This statement may, however, have been an attempt to dissuade Congress from enacting additional rights for CID recipients. Although Senator Hart spoke of "every single objection" available under the FRCP, the cases he referred to do not support such a broad
range of objections. He referred to: "permissible objections to grand jury subpenas
[sic]" and "objections to CID's" under the Act that had been permitted in reported
cases. The latter consisted of substantive objections, those available to challenge
grand jury subpoenas duces tecum, and procedural objections, those available under
§ 5(e) of the Act. Section 5(e) objections were those available under the FRCP in
proceedings to enforce, modify, or set aside CIDs. See note 61 supra. Thus, Senator
Hart believed that the only objections available under the FRCP were those procedural objections, under § 5(e) of the Act, available in proceedings to enforce, modify,
or set aside CIDs.
113. See text accompanying notes 102-108 supra.
114. See 122 CONG. REc. S15,416 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Hart). Senator Hart stated:
[In deciding which grounds are in fact "appropriate and consistent" for application to CIDs, the following factors are important and should be taken
into account:
(1) Investigations-unlike pre-trial discovery and litigation--are not adversary or adjudicatory;
(2) Pre-trial discovery and litigation have different purposes, a narrower
scope, and more clearly-defined issues than investigations have;
(3) Parties to pre-trial discovery and litigation are clearly identified,
while there are no parties in investigations-possible antitrust wrongdoers
are seldom firmly identified until way late in the investigation;
(4) Parties in pre-trial discovery and litigation have certain rights with
respect to notification, participation, intervention, confrontation, and crossexamination, whereas there are no such rights (even for targets) in investigations;
(5) Narrow, technical, or merely procedural objections which frustrate
expenditious [sic] civil antitrust investigations are normally not "appropriate
and consistent";
(6) Relevance in an investigation may be different from relevance in
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ture of an investigation differs from the nature of pretrial discovery
and litigation. Thus, the validity of a CID, an investigative tool,
should be determined using standards for investigative tools like
grand jury subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum rather than by
using standards for discovery devices.1 1 5
Representative Railsback criticized Senator Hart's statement of
intent and effect as an attempt to emasculate section 1312(c)(2):
The statement of intent [by Senator Hart] now suggests that
the Senate adopted the House language because it was essentially meaningless. The House report explains the language. It
should be emphasized that the provision embracing the Federal
rules would incorporate by reference any new developments
thereunder, generally shows greater sensitivity to matters such
as trade secrets, and would permit in appropriate cases protective orders and orders conditioning compliance upon the advancement of costs 116
The Representative indicated three areas that he believed
would not receive adequate protection from section 1312(c)(2), as
interpreted by Senator Hart and the House committee. However,
as interpreted by Senator Hart and the House committee, section
1312(c)(2) affords adequate protection from unreasonable investigatory demands. Representative Railsback's first concern was ensuring protection for trade secrets. However, under the Act
trade secrets received protection.1 1 7 Section 1312(c)(2), as interpreted by Senator Hart and the House committee, continues this
protection by allowing CID recipients to object to oppressive and
burdensome demands.1 1 8 His second concern was that CID recipients should be able to obtain protective orders in appropriate cases.
Section 1312(c)(2), as interpreted by Senator Hart and the House
committee, allows a CID recipient to obtain a protective order
pre-trial discovery of [sic] litigation-once litigation is begun, the interests
and scope of the matter tend to be much more specific and refined than in
investigations; and
(7) Civil antitrust investigations are nonetheless investigations and they
are in most respects close [sic] to grand jury investigations than they are to
pre-trial discovery or litigation.
id.
115.
regarded
character
116.
117.
118.

Senator Hart stated: "The application of the grand jury standard has been
since 1962 as appropriate in the CID context because of the investigative
of the Department's pre-complaint inquiry." Id.
Id. at H10,303 (daily ed. Sept 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Railsback).
See notes 63 & 101 supra.
In Aluminum Co. of America v. United States Dep't of Justice, 444 F.
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in such instances.
Representative Railsback's final concern was ensuring that
CID recipients receive the protection provided by orders conditioning compliance upon advancement of costs. Reading section
1312(c)(2) to import the procedural protections of the FRCP allows
such orders. These orders have a substantive effect when a private
party brings suit. 1 19 An order to advance a sum sufficient to cover
costs might deter a private party with limited resources from
bringing suit. However, such an order should not deter the government with its vast resources. In the case of a CID, such an order serves as a procedural device. Section 1312(c)(2), as interpreted
by Senator Hart and the House committee, allows FRCP procedural dictates to govern procedure, so long as they do not conflict
with the provisions or purposes of the amended Act. Thus an order
conditioning compliance with a CID upon advancement of costs
would be permitted under the amended Act.
Although section 1312(c)(2) as interpreted by Senator Hart and
the House Committee does address each of Representative Railsback's concerns, apparently the Representative believed this interpretation is inadequate because new developments under the
FRCP are not expressly incorporated into section 1312(c)(2). He
was also disturbed because he believed that section 1312(c)(2), as
so interpreted, is meaningless. However, this is not the case.
Congress designed both 1312(c)(1) and (c)(2) to afford adequate
protection from oppressive and unreasonable demands contained in
a CID, an investigative tool. Section 1312(c)(1) exists to allow a
court to test a CID for oppressiveness and unreasonableness, by

Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1978), the court premised an order to protect the trade secrets of
a CID recipient on the substantive standards of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The court directed the recipient to preselect those documents it did not want disclosed to third
parties during the Department's investigation. If the Department wished to disclose
any of these preselected documents during its investigation, the recipient could challenge the Department's decision. The recipient would be required "to demonstrate
to the Court the confidential nature of the documents and the irreparable competitive injury that would arise as a result [of disclosure]." 444 F. Supp. at 1348.
Both Senator Hart's and the House committee's interpretations allow such protection of trade secrets. Under Senator Hart's interpretation of § 1312(c)(2), a CID recipient may seek protection based upon FRCP substantive standards that allow a
court to protect a party from an oppressive or unduly burdensome demand. See text
accompanying note 110 supra. Under the House committee's interpretation of §
1312(c)(2), a CID recipient may seek protection for trade secrets. See note 101 supra.
119. Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (state statute that requires posting of bond for costs before stockholder may bring derivative
suit has substantive effect and must be complied with in federal court).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss4/7

28

CIDsDepartment's Power to Investigate Ci
EVOLUTION
Adler: The Evolution
of theOF
Justice

standards developed for testing criminal investigations. The consequences of the Department's inability to procure some types of information generally will equate in severity with the consequences
to a grand jury's inability to investigate fully. Thus the "safety valve"
modification provision of section 1312(c)(2) should not, except in
rare cases, lead to a different result for a CID as opposed to a
grand jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. Rather this subsection is intended to remind courts that these standards cannot be
lifted from the criminal context and applied to CIDs in the civil
context haphazardly, without regard for any differences in the two
situations. In addition section 1312(c)(2) provides procedural safeguards for CID recipients, such as protective orders that prohibit
the Department from publicly disclosing material received in response to a CID or orders conditioning compliance upon the advancement of costs.
To summarize, a CID recipient may refuse to answer a question or produce requested documents based upon a constitutional
or other legal right or privilege. The essence of the legal rights and
privileges provided by the amended Act is that a CID cannot contain a demand not permitted by a grand jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. In rare cases, however, a CID may be judged
by a harsher standard. Moreover, the amended Act provides certain procedural safeguards for CID recipients.
Transcriptof Oral Examination
The Department may issue a CID to compel appearance of a
witness at an oral examination. At the end of the oral examination,
the witness, who may have counsel present, has an opportunity to
examine the transcript and correct errors. 12 0 The investigator conducting the examination notes all changes and reasons given for
them.112 ' For a reasonable fee, the investigator will furnish the
witness, and only the witness, a copy of the transcript. 12 2 However, for "good cause" the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division may limit the witness to inspection of the official
transcript.1 2 3 Prior to enactment of the Amendments, the Assistant
Attorney General suggested that the witness would be able to receive a copy of the transcript except in very limited circumstances. 124
120.

15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(4)(1976).

121. Id.
122. Id.

§

1312(i)(6).

123. Id.
124. See H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 25 (letter from Ass't Att'y
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The House committee stated that "good cause" may exist "in
investigations where there is a possibility of witness intimidation,
economic reprisal, or the 'programmed' formulation of a common
defense by possible co-conspirators who 'tailor' their testimony to
match the evidence held by the government.' 1 2 5 "This 'good cause'
transcript access test is identical to the transcript access provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c), which governs investigations by all federal agencies." 126 Thus precedents under that statute can aid courts in determining whether good cause
exists.
Third Parties
The Department may issue a CID to any party possessing relevant information or documents, whether or not the Department is
investigating that party. 12 7 Under the Act, inability to issue CIDs
Gen. Thomas E. Kauper), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596,

2619.
125. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2609; accord, 122 CONG. REc. H10,292 (daily ed.

Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
To elucidate this further, the House committee cited United States v. Rose, 215
F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954), which involved an individual seeking to obtain a copy of his
grand jury testimony to prepare a defense to a perjury charge. The court noted that
five objectives necessitate maintaining secrecy for grand jury proceedings: (1) Preventing escape by those under investigation, (2) protecting the grand jury from outside influence, (3) preventing witness tampering, (4) encouraging individuals with
knowledge of a crime to come forward, and (5) protecting accused defendants who
are later exonerated. See id. at 628-29. The court concluded that "[s]ince all the defendant desires is a transcript of his own testimony, the sanctity of that which transpired before the Grand Jury is hardly in question. In addition, such disclosure
would not subvert any of the reasons traditionally given for the inviolability of Grand
Jury proceedings." Id. at 630 (emphasis in original). Citation of this case in the
House committee report suggests that the committee determined that "good cause"
to deny a witness a copy of his or her transcript in a civil antitrust investigation
should be determined in a manner similar to that used in the grand jury context.
126. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2609. The Administrative Procedure Act provides in
pertinent part:
A person compelled to submit data or evidence is entitled to retain or, on
payment of lawfully prescribed costs, procure a copy or transcript thereof,
except that in a nonpublic investigatory proceeding the witness may for
good cause be limited to inspection of the official transcript of his testimony.
5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1976). In In re Neil, 209 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.W. Va. 1962), the court
interpreted a prior, though essentially similar, statutory provision and concluded
"the witness should be furnished a copy of the transcript of his testimony without
being subjected to any unreasonable conditions." Id. at 79.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976). One court interpreted the amended Act as preventing the Department from issuing a CID to obtain documents from "any third
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to parties not under investigation deprived the Department of
sources possessing important information. 128 Third parties, such as
competitors, suppliers, customers, and employees, often have essential documents and information. 129 They may possess expertise
necessary for an understanding of a highly specialized or technical
market. In addition they may know of antitrust violations not recorded in any document. 130
The Department's ability to compel third parties to turn over
documents and information may result in third parties voluntarily
furnishing the Department with documents and information. If the
Department did not possess this power, these third parties might
fear retaliation by the party against whom they are supplying documents and information. However, because the Department can
compel production of this material, third parties have a valid excuse for voluntarily supplying information: They thus avoid the issuance of a CID which conceivably could encompass a much
broader range of materials than those supplied voluntarily.131
Miscellaneous
Under the Act, the Department could not issue CIDs to investigate proposed mergers or acquisitions. 132 However, the
Amendments allow the Department to issue CIDs to investigate
"activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition, joint venture,
party-such as an adversary in a lawsuit-who might have obtained possession of
[the investigated party's] documents other than in the ordinary course of business."
United States v. GAF Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 62,015, at 74,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
This court reasoned that the Department cannot issue a CID "to obtain from one
party to a treble damage suit certain documents its adversary has furnished it pursuant
to pretrial discovery." Id. at 74,349.
128. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 23 (letter from Ass't Att'y
Gen. Thomas E. Kauper), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596,
2617-18; S. 1284 Hearings, supra note 80, at 147 (statement of Ralph Nader and
Mark Green).
129. Trade associations are particularly valuable targets for CIDs. They have
detailed market data that the Department needs. H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2596, 2602. One Department lawyer wrote: "Trade associations are excellent sources of information about
their members' business practices, sales, revenues, market shares, and other business
facts. For that reason, trade associations can expect to be frequent recipients of antitrust CIDs ...." Reeves, supra note 4, at 356-57. See generally Fricano, supra note
82.
130. S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976).
131. Id. at 15.
132. United States v. Union Oil Co., 343 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1965). See note 48
supra and accompanying text.
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or similar transaction, which, if consumated, may result in an antitrust violation."' 33 The Department needs the power to enjoin
those activities that would violate the antitrust laws. Divestiture
after consummation is generally not an adequate remedy: It takes a
long time, and it is extremely difficult to undo a transaction once it
34
has taken place.'
The Amendments remove the Department's authority to issue
CIDs to investigate violations of the Federal Trade Commission
Act' 35 and unfair trade practices.' 36 This authority served no purpose.' 37 The FTC, which prosecutes these violations and practices,
has its own investigative capabilities. The Department should not
38
investigate for the FTC.'
While the Department may disclose information obtained pursuant to a CID to Congress,' 3 9 documents received in response to
a CID, answers given to written interrogatories, and transcripts of
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). Referring to Union Oil Co., the House subcommittee chairperson asked: "One issue is sharply defined by the bill [which became the
Amendments]: Should a lower Federal court's construction of the act that has reduced the use of CID's in investigating mergers as possibly violative of the Clayton
Act, be reversed?" H.R. 39 Hearings, supra note 76, at 14 _(statement of Rep.
Rodino). Congress answered "yes."
An early version of the Amendments would have allowed issuance of a CID to
investigate "any activities which may lead to any antitrust violation." H.R. 39, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., § a, H.R. 39 Hearings,supra note 76, at 4. Commenting upon the
breadth of this language, the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division
stated:
[Tihe major emphasis is on mergers and joint ventures. If there is concern
about the breadth of that language, I don't think we would be terribly concerned if it were so confined to eliminate any notion that what we are trying
to find out is whether somebody is thinking about violating the antitrust
laws. This is not what we have in mind.
The circumstances in which this is used would be where the parties
propose a transaction which they are going to implement, and have announced they are going to implement at a later date. That is our major concern, and that would be largely mergers and joint ventures, conduct subject
to the coverage of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Id. at 28 (statement of Thomas E. Kauper). See id. at 54-55 (Justice Department's
suggested amendments to H.R. 39).
134. Id. at 29 (statement of Thomas E. Kauper).
135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
136. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-435, § 101(1), 90 Stat. 1383 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970)).
137. See 122 CONG. REC. H10,292 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Rodino).
138. Id. However, the Department may make available to the FTC documents
and information obtained in response to a CID. Under the Act, it could not do so.
See note 49 supra. The FTC may use such documents and information in investigations and proceedings. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (1976).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1976).
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oral examinations are exempt 140 from the Freedom of Information
Act.141 Thus CID recipients need not fear undue publication of
confidential materials furnished in response to a Department request.
CONCLUSION

To enforce the antitrust laws efficiently, the Department
needs the power to obtain information at the start of its investigation of a suspected violation. Without such power, the Department
will waste its limited resources in pursuing a suspected violation
which either may not even be a violation or may not warrant further Department action. In addition, the more information the Department has, the better it is able to determine how to proceed
against the suspected violator.
Moreover, a suspected violator who is innocent is better protected if the Department can obtain information early in its investigation than if it cannot. If the Department charges an innocent suspect with violating the antitrust laws, the reputation and finances
of this suspected violator may suffer. However, if the Department
only investigates this suspected violator, this is less likely to occur.
Thus a suspected violator who is innocent benefits by the Department investigating and convincing itself of the investigated party's
innocence, rather than filing suit and making this determination
later.
To become convinced of the suspected violator's innocence,
the Department must have power to investigate thoroughly. How140. Id. § 1314(f).
141. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The Freedom of Information Act mandates that federal
agencies make their records available to the public, except in certain limited instances. Records protected from disclosure include: Certain national defense or foreign policy secrets; records of an agency's internal personnel rules and practices;
particular classes of matter exempt by statute; privileged and confidential trade secrets and commercial or financial information; interagency and intra-agency materials
that would be unavailable in litigation to nonagency parties; files on individuals, if
their disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes within certain criteria established by statute; certain reports prepared for agencies that regulate or supervise financial institutions; certain information concerning wells. Id. § 552(b).
Though material obtained in response to a CID may fit within the investigatory
records exemption, the Department sought an exemption from the Freedom of Infor-

mation Act for such material. The Department believed the certainty of exemption
would improve compliance by CID recipients, since they would know that any mate-

rial provided by them would not be turned over to third parties pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. See H.R. 39 Hearings,,supra note 76, at 27-28 (statement of Thomas E. Kauper).
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ever, the Department's power must be limited: Each time the Department investigates, it intrudes into people's lives. A proper balance needs to be reached between the Department's investigatory
power and the public's right to freedom from governmental intrusion.
Prior to 1962, the Department's means of investigating a suspected violation of the antitrust laws before filing suit were inadequate. In 1962, Congress passed the Act, giving the Department
limited power to issue CIDs. This narrowly circumscribed power
needed further expansion in order for the Department to perform
adequately its investigatory function. In 1976, Congress enacted
the Amendments, expanding the Department's precomplaint investigatory power. This should enable the Department to enforce the
antitrust laws more efficiently without tarnishing the reputation of
innocent suspects.
The balance between the Department's power to investigate
and the public's right to be free from governmental intrusion has
shifted over the years in favor of greater power for the Department. The question now is whether the Amendments have set the
balance aright. Senator Hart, one of the sponsors of the Amendments, believed they have. He commented: "We are confident that
the provisions of the amended [Act] strike a fair balance between
the rights of persons under investigation and third parties against
unreasonable Government intrusion and the need for effective and
efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws."142 Whether Senator
Hart's assessment is correct can only be tested by the operation of
the amended Act.
Sanford M. Adler*
142. 122 CONG. REc. S8268 (daily ed. May 28, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
* Mr. Adler is a 1978 graduate of the Law School and a former member of the
Review. The research and writing of this Note was completed while Mr. Adler was a
student at the Law School.
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